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Abstract in English 
In 1982 duration of university education in the Netherlands decreased from five to four years. 
This institutional reform is exploited for estimating the causal effect of one year of university 
education on wages in 1997. Wages of employees who enrolled just before or after the reform 
are compared using data from the Dutch Wage Structure Survey of 1997. We find that the fifth 
year of university education increased wages with 7 to 9 percent. This wage differential is found 
for employees enrolling four years before or after the reform. Confounding factors like time-
effects, typical age-effects or ability-bias do not seem to bias the main results. The findings 
suggest that there is scope for increasing private contributions of students. Moreover, the reform 
may have harmed total welfare. Alternative policies of sticking to five-year duration and 
increasing private contributions for higher education could have given a more favourable 
outcome. 
 
Keywords: private returns to university education, natural experiment,  
Abstract in Dutch 
Met de invoering van de zogenoemde Tweefasen Structuur in 1982 is de nominale duur van een 
opleiding in het wetenschappelijk onderwijs verminderd van vijf naar vier jaar. Deze 
institutionele verandering is in deze studie gebruikt om het causale effect te bepalen van één 
jaar wetenschappelijk onderwijs op de lonen in 1997. Daarvoor zijn de lonen vergeleken van 
personen die studeerden net voor en net na de verandering. De gegevens zijn afkomstig uit het 
Loon Structuur Onderzoek 1997 van het CBS. Het empirisch onderzoek wijst erop dat het 
vijfde jaar wetenschappelijk onderwijs geleid 7 tot 9 procent meer loon oplevert. Dit 
loonverschil wordt gevonden door de vier ‘jaargangen’ van voor de hervorming te vergelijken 
met de vier ‘jaargangen’ van na de hervorming. De resultaten lijken niet te worden vertekend 
door mogelijk verstorende factoren als tijdseffecten, leeftijdseffecten of selectieve instroom van 
studenten. De bevindingen suggereren dat er ruimte is voor een verhoging van private bijdragen 
van studenten. Daarnaast lijkt de hervorming nadelig te zijn geweest voor de Nederlandse 
welvaart. Het handhaven van de vijfjarige nominale duur en het verhogen van private bijdragen 
voor hoger onderwijs had mogelijk een betere uitkomst gegeven.  
 
Steekwoorden: privaat rendement van wetenschappelijk onderwijs, natuurlijk experiment 
Nederlandse samenvatting beschikbaar op www.cpb.nl.  4   5 
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Summary 
A prominent policy option in Dutch higher education is to increase private contributions in 
combination with a reform of the student support system. Insight into the private returns to 
higher education can be important for the current debate as it indicates the scope for changing 
the level of contributions. This paper estimates the wage effect of one year of university 
education.  
It is well known that wage differences between higher educated and lower educated 
employees might not reflect the causal effect of schooling. Higher educated employees differ in 
many respects from lower educated employees and not all differences are observed. 
Unobserved factors, such as motivation or intelligence, can bias the estimated effects of 
education on earnings. Exogenous variation in education can solve this problem. This paper 
uses a major reform, introduced in 1982, which reduced the duration of university education 
from five to four years. For identifying the causal effect of one year of university education 
wages of graduates who enrolled four years before and after the reform are compared. Data 
from the Dutch wage structure survey of 1997 have been used. 
The main finding of this paper is that graduates in the five-year regime earn on average 7 to 
9 percent more than graduates in the four-year regime. Confounding factors such as time-
effects, typical age-effects or ability-bias do not seem to threaten the main results. First, a 
sudden change in the wages of higher educated employees might bias our results. However, a 
comparison with wages of graduates of higher professional education shows that only wages of 
university graduates increased in the relevant years. Second, the discontinuity in wages might 
be the result of ‘typical age-effects’ of university graduates. However, we do not find sudden 
increases of wages of university graduates around the age of 35 in earlier years (1979 and 
1985). We only find a discontinuity in wages of university graduates in 1997. Third, if the four-
year regime attracted more low ability students the discontinuity in wages might be caused by 
differences in ability. If ability bias would be important we only expect to find a wage 
difference in the lowest parts of the wage distribution. However, the wage difference between 
the two regimes is found over most parts of the wage distribution.  
The results of this paper indicate that a fifth year of university education can be very 
profitable for participants. The high private returns suggest that there is scope for private 
contributions. The analysis of this paper can also be seen as a partial evaluation of the reform of 
1982. We find that the reform decreased earnings opportunities for all graduates from the four-
year studies. This suggests that the reform of 1982 was harmful for total welfare as it is unlikely 
that the government savings from the reduction of the duration of education outweigh the 
earnings reduction. An alternative policy of sticking to the five-year duration and increasing 
private contributions for higher education might have given a more favourable outcome. 
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1  Introduction 
Dutch higher education is undergoing some major restructuring. Recently the bachelor/ master 
structure has been introduced to facilitate international mobility of students in the European 
Union. The discussion centres on the length of a Masters education and the issue of public or 
private financing. Moreover, there is discussion about the current system of the financial 
student support and the central regulation of college fees.  
This report analyses the causal effect of university education on wages. It is well know that 
wage differences between higher educated and lower educated employees might not reflect the 
causal effect of schooling because of endogeneity problems. Higher educated employees differ 
in many respects from lower educated employees and not all differences are observed. 
Unobserved factors, such as motivation or intelligence, can bias the estimated effect of 
education on earnings. Exogenous variation in education can solve the endogeneity problem. 
Institutional changes might be a source of exogenous variation in education because all 
participants, irrespective of motivation or intelligence, are confronted with these changes. This 
paper uses a major reform in Dutch university education, introduced in 1982. The reform 
reduced the length of university education for all students from five to four years. We exploit 
this reform as a natural experiment for estimating the causal effect of one year of university 
education on wages in 1997. For this, we compare wages of employees who studied just before 
or after the reform. 
This report aims to contribute to current policy discussions. The evidence on the returns to 
an extra year of university education is relevant for the current discussion on the length of a 
Masters Education. Second, the results of this paper can be important for students deciding on 
enrolling in higher education. What are the benefits compared to the costs. The results can also 
be relevant for financing issues of higher education if the private returns could be compared 
with the social returns. In addition, this paper contributes to the economic literature on the 
private returns to education. First, we estimate the returns for a specific group: university 
graduates. Second, we study the effects of a reduction of the length of education whereas the 
literature concerns the effects of increasing the length of education. Does reducing the length of 
education give similar results as the effects of increasing the length of education from the 
literature? Third, estimates for the Netherlands that take endogeneity into account are scarce.
1  
This study provides new evidence for the Netherlands. 
For identifying the causal effect of one year of university education we compare wages of 
graduates who enrolled four years before and after the reform. As we do not directly observe 
whether a graduate has been treated with the fifth year of university education we use age to 
distinguish between graduates from the four and five-year regime. We find a discontinuity in 
the wage level of university graduates, which coincides with the reduction of duration of 
university education. On average graduates assigned to the five-year regime earn 7 to 9 percent 
 
1 Two Dutch studies take endogeneity into account: Levin and Plug (1999), Kalwij (2000)   10 
more than graduates in the four-year regime. This wage difference is robust for different 
specifications and different years around the reform. We consider three potential confounding 
factors: time-effects, ‘typical age-effects’ or ability-bias. First, a sudden change in wages of 
higher educated employees might bias our results. We checked whether these time-effects 
played a role in a difference in difference analysis in which graduates from higher professional 
education are used as a counterfactual. Higher vocational education is the second type of higher 
education in the Netherlands and it’s duration of four years did not change in the relevant 
period. This analysis shows that only wages of university graduates increased in the relevant 
years. Second, the discontinuity in wages might be the result of ‘typical age-effects’ of 
university graduates. Do university graduates typically receive a sudden wage increase at the 
age of 35? If this is the case our findings may not be caused by the extra year of education. 
However, we do not find this ‘typical age-effect’ on wages of university graduates in 1979 and 
1985. We only find a discontinuity in wages of university graduates in 1997. Third, if the four-
year regime attracted more low ability students the discontinuity in wages might be caused by 
the difference in ability. Enrolment actually increased after the introduction of the new regime 
but this might be the result of demographic factors because the number of graduates from pre-
university education also increased. The lowest estimates of the wage difference drop some 1.5 
percent point if we remove 10 percent of the lowest wages from the relevant age-groups of the 
new regime. This implies the strong assumption that the introduction of the new regime induced 
these graduates to enter university. A comparison of trends in enrolment and graduation in pre-
university education suggest that this simulation might overrate the increase in enrolment 
resulting from the reform. Moreover, we performed a quantile regression on the reduced sample 
to check whether the wage difference only occurs in the lowest parts of the wage distribution. 
The analysis shows substantial wage differences between graduates from the two regimes over 
most parts of the wage distribution. We conclude that all three confounding factors do not 
seriously bias our results.   11 
2  Background of the reform 
The discussion on the structure of Dutch higher education dates back to the end of the Second 
World War (the state committee Reinink (1949)). Many commissions spoke out concerns about 
overeducation. But until the early eighties not much changed and the standard duration of 
university education was five years. In August 1982 duration changed to four years. The main 
reason for this reform was a financial one and had nothing to do with overeducation. Increasing 
enrolment had put pressure on the budget for higher education. The Dutch Minister of education 
and science mr. Pais solved this problem by shortening duration of studies. In this way costs 
were reduced without restricting enrolment. The reduction of duration of studies with one year 
was not implemented by skipping the fifth year of studies. In general studies reduced many 
parts of the curriculum, ‘key elements’ survived and ‘voluntarily’ elements were brought back 
in duration.  
The reform intended to change university education in a so-called two-stage-structure. The 
first stage consisted of the standard university degree of fours years that included a propedeutic 
exam after one year. The second stage was meant as preparation for scientific research. The 
duration of this stage should be no more than 2 years. This second part of the reform was in fact 
never implemented. In 1984 the new Minister Deetman introduced a new system for PhD-
students, the so-called AIO-system with duration of four years.   12   13 
3  Review of literature and identification strategy 
The traditional way of identifying the wage effect of an extra year of schooling is to estimate a 
Mincer type of wage equation. In this equation (log) wages is used as the dependent variable 
and regressed on the number of schooling years (and several covariates). It can be shown that 
the coefficient of the schooling variable represents the private return to one year of education. 
With this approach we find the private return of a year of university education in the 
Netherlands to be nearly 11 percent (see appendix). It is well known that the estimated 
coefficient for the schooling variable might not reflect the causal effect of education on earnings 
because of endogeneity problems. A huge literature deals with this problem and describes new 
approaches such as natural experiments or twin studies (see for instance, Card, 1999 or 
Ashenfelter et al. (1999)). Several studies used institutional changes of the education system as 
a source of exogenous variation in education. The seminal study in this line of research is 
Angrist & Krueger (1991). They use the fact that the school year for all 6-year olds in the US 
starts on the same date together with compulsory schooling laws binding students to schools up 
till the age of 16. As a result, students born early in the year on average follow less education 
than students born later in the year. They use this variation in schooling for identifying the 
causal effect of education on earnings. One year of education is estimated to give 6 to 8 percent 
higher wages. Harmon & Walker (1995) use the raising of the minimum school-leaving age in 
the United Kingdom (which occurred in 1947 and 1973) as a source of exogenous variation in 
education. They find an estimate of schooling return of more than 15 percent. The same 
approach is used by Levin & Plug (1999) and Vieira (1999). Meghir & Palme (2001) use a 
major education reform in Sweden, which was implemented in the 1960s. Before the country-
wide implementation a proportion of municipalities started with the new school system. They 
find that the reform increased educational attainment of individuals from poorer backgrounds 
and that the returns to schooling depend on the ability of individuals. The returns for high 
ability individuals are estimated to be 7.5 percent. Low ability individual have lower returns.  
Aakvik, Salvanes & Vaage (2003) exploit a major reform in the comprehensive school system 
in Norway in the 1960s. As in Sweden, there is a staged implementation. They find that the 
returns to schooling are strongly nonlinear, depending on the type of education. 
Identification Strategy 
We use the university reform of 1982 for identifying the wage effect of one year of university 
education. The reform creates a discontinuity in educational attainment for graduates who 
started studying in higher education before or after the reform. All graduates who started higher 
education in august 1982 or later entered the four-year regime. Graduates who started before 
august 1982 entered the five year regime. They had to follow the fifth year of university 
education. This type of discontinuity can be exploited with a regression-discontinuity design 
(RD design). The RD design exploits a known discontinuity in the treatment assignment to   14 
identify the treatment effect (the fifth year of higher education). There are two types of designs. 
In a sharp design the discontinuity completely determines the treatment. In case of a fuzzy 
design the discontinuity determines the probability of being treated. Literature on these methods 
dates back to Campbell (1969), for a recent application see Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004, 
forthcoming). This paper would be an application of a sharp design if we could observe whether 
a graduate has been treated with the fifth year of education. However, this is not the case. We 
use age to distinguish between graduates from the four and five-year regime. Our design 
translates to the fuzzy type because age does not completely determine the treatment. In Dutch 
education the way to university runs through pre-university education, which is a six-year type 
of secondary education. Students who follow the fastest way can enter university at the age of 
18. As many university students in Dutch education have some delay age is not a perfect 
predictor of the university regime taken by the graduate. All graduates born on or after the first 
of August 1963 were not treated with the extra year. Graduates born earlier had a probability of 
being treated with the fifth year. The probability becomes larger when the distance between the 
date of birth and the first of august 1963 increases. The probability of receiving the extra year of 
university education ( i t ) depends on the date of birth ( i d ) with a known discontinuity at 
point 
-
d  (in our case August 1 1963).  
  } { 1 , ( ) Pr(
-
£ = d d d f t i i i   (3.1) 
The outcome is the wage increase from the fifth year of university education and can be 
described as follows 
  i i t W b a + = ln   (3.2) 
where a is the wage without the fifth year of university education, and b  is the wage change 
due to the fifth year of university education.  
Our empirical strategy for identifying the wage effect of the fifth year of university education 
comes down to comparing the wages of employees born around the cut-off date related to the 
introduction of the reform. This comparison will give an unbiased estimate of the treatment 
effect if there is no reason to believe that persons close to 
-
d  are different. The major 
identifying assumption is that there are no other discontinuities around 
-
d . The treatment effect 
in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design has been estimated with an instrumental variable 
approach (Van der Klaauw (2002), Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004)). In the first stage equation 
the treatment is regressed on the discontinuity. Our application differs as we do not observe 
whether the graduate has been treated with the fifth year of university education (we can not 
estimate the first stage equation). We therefore estimate a reduced form equation 
  X T Wi d b a + + = ln   (3.3)   15 
in which T is the treatment variable and X is a set of control variables. If students did not have 
any delay in previous education and we could observe the month of birth we would define T=1 
if the employee is born before August 1 1963, and T=0 is born after August 1 1963. We deviate 
from this for two reasons. First, we only observe the year of birth. Second, general statistics 
suggest that at least half of the students have a delay of one year in pre university education. 
Moreover, after enrolment, 30 to 50 percent of students drop out or switches to another study. 
As a consequence, we expect that the majority of students born in 1963 entered the new regime 
and that students born in 1962 where allocated over both regimes (see appendix for more 
details). We therefore excluded graduates born in 1962 from the analysis and define  
 
T=1 if the employee is born before 1962;  
T=0 if the employee is born after 1962. 
 
We estimated this reduced form equation using four so-called discontinuity samples. 
Discontinuity sample ±1 (abbreviated DS±1) consist of the treatment group of graduates born in 
the first year before 1962 and the control group of employees born in the first year after 1962. 
Discontinuity sample ±4 (abbreviated DS±4) consists of the treatment group of graduates born 
in the first four years before 1962 and the control group of graduates born in the first four years 
after 1962.   16   17 
4  Data 
The data we use come from the so-called Wage Structure Survey (Loon Structuur Onderzoek 
(LSO)) held by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). Data on wages are obtained through the annual 
survey on employment and wages among firms (Enquête naar Werkgelegenheid en Lonen) and 
partly through Administrations on insured people (Verzekerden Administratie (VZA)). This 
means that all information on wages comes from administrative sources (firms or 
administrations on insured people). This dataset also contains information on gender, age and 
job characteristics. Data on education are obtained from the annual labour force survey 
(Enquête Beroepsbevolking (EBB)) and matched with the wage data. This matched dataset is 
called the Wage Structure Survey.  
The main data we use come from the survey of 1997. The total sample consists of nearly 
120.000 employees. We use sub samples of graduates from university education and higher 
professional education born between 1958 and 1966. Table 1 shows statistics for graduates 
assigned to the old and new regime. The dependent variable in the analysis is gross hourly wage 
in 1997. As independent variables we use: gender, education (4-digit coding according to the 
Standard Education Coding), age (measured in years in December of the year of the survey), 
age squared, experience (the difference between age and year of graduation), experience 
squared and potential experience (the difference between age and the nominal duration of 
education). The data on the year of graduation seem to contain measurement errors. In the 
analysis we corrected the experience variable based on the year of graduation by using a 
maximum experience level. All employees with experience above this level where assigned a 
maximum based on the nominal duration of the study. Moreover, in the analysis we use 
potential experience which is the standard approach in estimating the Mincerian wage equation. 
We also control for firm characteristics: type of industry measured at 2-digit level (SBI-code) 
and firm size measured as the (log) number of employees. We restrict the analysis to employees 
with a Dutch nationality. We do not have information whether non-Dutch employees were 
educated in the Netherlands or elsewhere. Moreover, we exclude self-employed and employees 
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Table 4.1  Sample statistics of graduates in old and new regime in 1997 
University         Treatment group          Control group 
         Graduates born in 1958-1961 (n=1158)          Graduates born in 1963-1966 (n=1192) 
  mean  st. dev.  min  max  mean  st. dev.  min  max 
                 
(Ln)wage  3.78  0.34  2.66  5.18  3.61  0.32  2.44  4.82 
Female (%)  32.9  47.00      40.9  49.2     
Graduation date  1987  3.6  1965  1998  1990  2.8  1953  1998 
Experience  10.5  3.3  0  15  7.3  2.4  0  11 
Potential experience  13.4  1.1  12  15  9.5  1.1  8  11 
Age  37.4  1.1  36  39  32.5  1.1  31  34 
Firm size  5613  11086  1  56804  4770  10274  1  64974 
     
Higher professional         Graduates born in 1958-1961 (n=2840)          Graduates born in 1963-1966 (n=2837) 
  mean  st. dev.  min  max  mean  st. dev.  min  max 
                 
(Ln)wage  3.58  0.32  2.40  5.21  3.47  0.28  2.42  4.95 
Female (%)  44.0  49.6      45.3  49.8     
Graduation date  1985  5.1  1920  1998  1989  3.5  1963  1998 
Experience  12.3  4.4  0  17  8.6  2.8  0  12 
Potential experience  15.5  1.1  14  17  10.5  1.1  9  12 
Age  37.5  1.1  36  39  32.5  1.1  31  34 
Firm size  4031  10094  1  64974  4151  10515  1  64974 
 
We also use data from the Dutch Wage Structure surveys of 1979 and 1985. The sample 
statistics of university graduates from these years are shown in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2  Sample statistics for 1979 and 1985 
1979     Treatment group          Control group 
     Graduates 36-39 years (n=90)          Graduates 31-34 years (n=141) 
  mean  st. dev.  min  max  mean  st. dev.  min  max 
                 
(Ln)wage  3.51  0.17  3.03  4.07  3.32  0.22  2.52  4.06 
Female (%)  6.6  25      9.9  30.0     
Age  37.5  1.1  36  39  32.4  1.1  31  34 
     
1985     Graduates 36-39 years (n=53)           Graduates 31-34 years (n=47) 
  mean  st. dev.  min  max  mean  st. dev.  min  max 
                 
(Ln)wage  3.46  0.24  2.69  4.29  3.33  0.27  2.80  3.87 
Female (%)  13.2  34.2      29.8  46.2     
Age  37.5  1.2  36  39  32.9  1.1  31  34 
   19 
5  Results 
For a first impression of the wage effects of the reform we regress wages on age controlling for 
experience, experience squared, type of education and gender. University graduates aged 34 are 
the first year-cohort in the four-year regime. We take this group as a reference in figure 5.1. 
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Wages increase sharply for university graduates in the four-year regime until the age of 32. 
Then they stabilise for two years. This pattern is typical for new entrants on the labour market. 
In the first years wages increase more than the average effect of experience (and experience-
squared) from our specification. After a few years wages come in line with the average effect of 
experience on wages. Between the age of 34 and 36 there is again a sharp rise in earnings. The 
timing of this increase coincides with the reform in university education. Wages of 35-year olds 
lie between the two regimes, conform expectations based on general statistics. After the age of 
36 wages are more stable and move around the 10 percent line. This pattern suggests a clear 
wage difference between graduates in the four- and five-year regime.  
Next, we more closely examine wage differences between age groups around the regime 
change. We estimate wage differences using four discontinuity samples around the regime 
change.  In table 5.1 we present estimates using four different specifications. The first column 
controls for type of education, gender and experience measured by year of graduation. In the 
second column we use potential experience, which is the standard experience variable from the 
Mincer equation. The third and fourth column also control for firm characteristics and labour 
market conditions in the year of graduation. In column (3) we use type of industry and firm 
size. In column (4) we control for labour market conditions in 1987 and 1988. In these two   20 
years a double flow of university graduates (from both regimes) entered the labour market.
2  We 
estimated the model separately for each discontinuity sample. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. 
Table 5.1  Wage difference between graduates born before and after 1962 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
DS+/-1  0.086       
  (0.027)       
N  604       
DS+/-2  0.078  0.116  0.096  0.100 
  (0.020)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.038) 
N  1221  1221  1221  1221 
DS+/-3  0.076  0.095  0.074  0.077 
  (0.017)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.030) 
N  1813  1813  1813  1813 
DS+/-4  0.089  0.088  0.070  0.072 
  (0.015)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
N  2350  2350  2350  2350 
         
Controls         
Experience  yes  no  no  no 
Potential experience  no  yes  yes  yes 
Firm characteristics  no  no  yes  yes 
Dummies 87/88  no  no  no  yes 
         
Notes: Coefficients shown in columns 1 to 4 are coefficient of a dummy in an OLS regression, standard errors in parentheses. Individuals 
born in 1962 are excluded from the estimations. All models control for gender, education (4-digit level). Controls denoted by ‘experience’ 
are experience and experience squared based on year of graduation. Controls denoted by ‘potential experience’ are potential experience 
and potential experience squared based on age. Firm characteristics are type of industry (2-digit level) and (log) number of employees. 
Dummies 87/88 are dummies for graduation years 1987 and 1988.  
 
The estimates in column (1), using basic controls and experience based on the year of 
graduation, indicate that employees who graduated in the old regime earn some 7.6 to 8.9 
percent more that employees who enrolled after the reform. The wage difference increases if we 
include potential experience (column (2)) instead of measured experience. In the four year 
discontinuity sample we find almost the same wage difference. Including firm characteristics 
lowers the estimates (column (3)). Adding dummies for the high outflow years 1987 and 1988 
gives slightly higher estimates (column (4)). In general, unemployment was higher in the first 
half of the eighties when graduates from the old regime entered the labour market. These 
unfavourable starting conditions could have a downward bias on the estimated wage 
difference.
3 All specifications indicate wage differences between graduates from the four and 
five-year regime between 7 and 9 percent. The smallest estimate comes from the largest 
 
2 In 1985 there were 20,100 university graduates, in 1986 29,500, 1987 25,000, 1988 19,400 and in 1989 20,100. 
3 We constructed a time series of the unemployment rate for those aged 25-34 years based on the Dutch Labour Force 
Surveys 1970-1997 and included this variable in the analysis. However, the results seemed not very plausible. Higher 
unemployment at the time of entering the labour market increased wages.   21 
discontinuity sample. Moving further from the regime change offers more ground for 
confounding factors. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that the extra year of university 
education caused a wage increase between 7 and 9 percent.  
In table 5.1 we leave out graduates born in 1962. This decision is based on general statistics 
on drop out and the delay of students in pre-university education. However, it might be argued 
that employees born in 1963 could also be divided over both regimes and should be left out 
from the analysis. We therefore repeated the analysis after excluding graduates born in 1963 
and adding graduates born in 1967 to the four-year discontinuity sample. A drawback of this 
approach is that we move further from the cut-off date and to left and steeper part of the 
earnings function in figure 5.1. With this approach the range of findings increases and the 
lowest estimates of the wage difference are close to 6 percent (appendix A.3).     22   23 
6  Confounding factors 
Several factors might bias the results in the previous section. We investigate the bias of three 
factors: time effects around the reform, typical age-effects for university graduates and ability-
bias  
6.1  Time effects 
The major identifying assumption in the previous analysis is that there are no other 
discontinuities around the reform. In other words, the wage difference between graduates from 
the old regime and graduates from the new regime can only be related to the reform and not to 
other differences in the years just before and after the regime change. For instance, if there was 
a sudden change in wages for higher educated employees at the time of the reform we could 
falsely ascribe this to the reform. In order to control for time effects we compare wage changes 
of university graduates with wage changes of graduates of higher professional education of the 
same age. Dutch higher education consists of two levels: university education and higher 
professional education. The latter has duration of four years and this did not change in the 
period of the university reform.  If time effects occurred we expect this to be reflected in the 
wages of graduates of higher professional education. First, we repeated the previous analysis for 
graduates from higher professional education of the same age. Next, we performed a difference 
in difference analysis. This analysis compares the wage difference between university graduates 
from the two regimes with the wage difference between graduates from higher professional 
education from the two age-groups. The treatment effect ( b ) of one year of university 
education then can be found as: 
) ln (ln ) ln (ln 66 63 61 58 66 63 61 58
hp hp u u W W W W - - - - - - - = b   (6.1) 
with  u W 61 58 ln - is the wage of university graduates from the old regime (born in 1958-1961) and 
hp W 66 63 ln -  is wages of graduates from higher professional education from the age-groups 
parallel to the new university regime (born in 1963-1966). In table 6.1 we present estimation 
results for the most extended specification (column 4 in table 5.1). The first column repeats the 
results for university graduates. The second column shows results for graduates from higher 
professional education. The third column shows results of the difference in difference analysis. 
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Table 6.1  Wage difference between graduates from university and higher professional education born 
before and after 1962 
  University (1)  Higher Professional (2)  (1) – (2) 
       
DS+/-2  0.100  - 0.036  0.136 
  (0.038)  (0.031)  (0.048) 
N  1221  2888  4109 
DS+/-3  0.077  0.004  0.073 
  (0.030)  (0.021)  (0.035) 
N  1813  4316  6129 
DS+/-4  0.072  0.007  0.065 
  (0.025)  (0.017)  (0.029) 
N  2350  5677  8027 
       
Notes: Controls used are gender, type of education, potential experience, potential experience squared, type of industry, (log) number of 
employees in firm, year dummies if graduated in 1987 and 1988.  
 
Time-effects do not seem to bias previous estimates. We do not find wage differences for 
graduates from higher professional education (column 2). Therefore, the difference in 
difference estimates, which captures the difference between column 1 and column 2, are 
comparable to the estimates in column 1. The estimates for the 2-year discontinuity sample are 
even higher. 
6.2  Typical age-effects for university graduates 
If the age-experience profiles of university graduates typically have a discontinuity at the age of 
35 we might falsely relate this to the reform. To check whether this is the case we repeat the 
analysis of section 5 on data from the Wage Structure Surveys of 1979 and 1985. The first 
column of table 6.2 gives the results for 1979, the second column for 1985 and the third column 
for 1997. The surveys of 1979 and 1985 do not have a detailed education variable. In table 6.2 
we control for gender, potential experience, potential experience-squared and education at two-
digit level.  
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Table 6.2  Wage difference between university graduates older and younger than 35 years in 1979, 1985 
and 1997 
  1979  1985  1997 
       
DS+/-1  - 0.017  0.021  0.124 
  (0.050)  (0.083)  (0.025) 
N  54  35  665 
DS+/-2  - 0.257  - 0.159  0.116 
  (0.115)  (0.186)  (0.040) 
N  107  57  1356 
DS+/-3  - 0.173  - 0.091  0.091 
  (0.082)  (0.128)  (0.030) 
  173  78  2013 
DS+/-4  - 0.033  - 0.075  0.080 
  (0.065)  (0.108)  (0.026) 
N  231  100  2607 
       
Note: Controls used are gender, type of education (2-digit), age and age squared. 
 
Both for 1979 and 1985 we do not find a typical discontinuity at the age of 35. In both years 
older graduates on average earn less than younger graduates. This clearly deviates from the 
findings for 1997. 
6.3  Selection effects 
Despite the fact that we focus on an institutional reform to solve the endogeneity problem there 
still might be self-selection of students. The reduction in duration of university education might 
have attracted more or different students because of lower investment costs and lower drop-out 
risk. In fact, enrolment in university education increased after the reform. In the years before the 
reform approximately 23,500 students yearly enrolled. After the reform this went up to nearly 
27,000 students.
4 However, a substantial part of this increase might have a demographic cause. 
The number of graduates from pre-university education, which gives direct access to university, 
increased from approximately 29,600 in 1981 to 33,000 in 1985.
5 If the 4-year regime attracted 
more low-ability students the results in section 5 might suffer from ability-bias. To check 
whether selection bias confounds our results we excluded graduates from the new regime with 
the lowest wages. We left out 10 percent of graduates of each separate birth year of the new 
regime, except 1963. This exclusion is roughly based on the figures on enrolment and 
graduation in pre-university education. We did not leave out low earners born in 1963 because 
the increase of graduates from pre-university education is larger than the increase in enrolment.  
 
4 The exact figures on freshmen enrolling are: 23,513 in 1981, 24,243 in 1982, 26,816 in 1983, 26,845 in 1984 and 26,707 in 
1985. 
5 The exact figures are: 29,600 in 1981, 30,800 in 1982, 31,200 in 1983, 31,700 in 1984 and 33,100 in 1985.   26 
This exclusion of low wage graduates probably overrates the change in enrolment caused by the 
introduction of the new four-year regime. On this reduced sample we first estimated the wage 
effect of the extra year of university education. Next, we performed a quantile regression to 
investigate whether the wage difference only occurs in the lowest part of the wage distribution 
or can also be found in the upper parts of the wage distribution. We expect no wage difference 
between the two regimes in the higher parts of the wage distribution if our previous findings are 
the result of ability bias. In a quantile regression the coefficients are estimated for different 
quantiles of the wage distribution (see Buchinsky, 1994). The quantile regression model can be 
written as: 
i i i u X W q q b + = ln with Quant q q b i i i X X W = ) (ln   (6.2) 
 
where  i X    is the vector of exogenous variables and  q b is the vector of parameters. 
Quant ) (ln X W q denotes the q  th conditional quantile of lnW given X. The q th regression 
quantile,  1 0 < <q  , is defined as a solution to the problem: 
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X W i X W   (6.3) 
 
By variation of q , any quantile of the conditional distribution can be obtained. 
Table 6.3 shows estimates of the wage difference for the reduced sample. Column 1 shows the 
standard regression results for the reduced sample, column 2 shows results for the 10-th 
quantile, the lower part of the wage distribution and column 6 for the 90-th quantile, the upper 
part of the wage distribution. 
Table 6.3  Wage differences between university graduates born before and after 1962 for various quantiles 
of the wage distribution after excluding low wage of new regime 
  Standard  10  25  50  75  90  N 
               
DS+/-2  0.131  0.125  0.149  0.127  0.142  0.139  1190 
  (0.037)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    
DS+/-3  0.077  0.110  0.091  0.051  0.056  0.033  1754 
  (0.028)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
DS+/-4  0.055  0.104  0.061  0.061  0.057  0.020  2356 
  (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.010)   
               
Notes: 10 % lowest wages of those born in 1964, 1965 and 1996 are excluded. Controls used are gender, type of education, potential 
experience, potential experience squared, type of industry, (log) number of employees in firm, dummies if graduated in 1987 or 1988. 
 
Removing low-wage graduates from the new regime lowers the estimated wage differences in 
the three- and four-year sample to 7.7 and 5.5 percent. This can be seen as lower bound results 
given the fact that we probably removed too many graduates. In addition, our assumption that 
the reform induced these graduates to enter university may not hold. The estimated wage   27 
difference for the two-year sample increases. Removing graduates with the lowest wages also 
changes other coefficients in the model. The model for the two-year sample is sensitive for this 
because of the smaller sample and the smaller period for estimating the coefficient on 
experience. As the results for the three and four-year samples are less sensitive for this they can 
be better compared with previous estimates. The results of the quantile regression indicate that 
the extra year of university education pays more in the lowest part of the wage distribution. 
However, substantial wage differences are found over most parts of the wage distribution. For 
instance, we find a wage difference of more than 5.5 percent for the 75-th percentile of the 
wage distribution. We think this excludes ability bias as the main reason for the wage 
differences found in the previous section. If we accept the strong assumption that the 
introduction of the new regime induced the low-wage graduates to enter university we find a 
wage difference of 5.5 percent. 
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7  Conclusions and discussion 
The reduction of duration of university education coincides with a discontinuity in the wage 
level of university graduates. Graduates in the five-year regime earn on average 7 to 9 percent 
more than graduates in the four-year regime. Confounding factors such as time-effects, typical 
age-effects or ability-bias do not threaten the main results. First, a sudden change in the wages 
of higher educated employees might bias our results. However, a comparison with wages of 
graduates of higher professional education shows that only wages of university graduates 
increased in the relevant years. Second, the discontinuity in wages might be the result of 
‘typical age-effects’ of university graduates. However, we do not find sudden increases of 
wages of university graduates around the age of 35 in earlier years (1979 and 1985). We only 
find a discontinuity in wages of university graduates in 1997. Third, if the four-year regime 
attracted more low ability students the discontinuity in wages might be caused by differences in 
ability. Enrolment increased after the introduction of the new regime but this might be the result 
of demographic factors as the number of graduates from pre-university education also 
increased. The lowest estimate of the wage difference drops to 5.5 percent if we remove 10 
percent of the lowest wages from the relevant age-groups of the new regime. This implies the 
strong assumption that the introduction of the new regime induced these graduates to enter 
university. Moreover, the wage difference between the two regimes is found over most parts of 
the wage distribution. If ability bias would be important we only expect to find a wage 
difference in the lowest parts of the wage distribution. 
Policy implications 
This paper shows that a fifth year of university education can be very profitable for participants. 
In the current policy context this might imply that a second year of a masters education can 
yield high returns. At the moment government subsidies cover about 88 percent of costs of 
higher education. The high private returns suggest that there is scope for private contributions. 
An income contingent loan system can increase private contributions without loss of 
accessibility of higher education (see CPB, 2003). 
The analysis of this paper can also be seen as a partial evaluation of the reform of 1982. We 
find that the reform decreased earnings opportunities for all graduates from the four-year 
studies. This reduction of earnings and productivity was not intended and should be weighted 
against government savings from the reduction of duration. Jacobs and Canton (2003) calculate 
that increasing private contributions from the current 12 percent to 37.5 percent corresponds to 
an average of 3.5 percent of lifetime income of Dutch university graduates. The government 
savings of one year higher education are about this size and clearly do not outweigh the 
earnings reduction. We conclude that the reduction of 1982 was harmful for total welfare. It is 
likely that an alternative policy of sticking to the five-year duration and increasing private 
contributions for higher education would have given a more favourable outcome.   30   31 
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Appendix 1: OLS-estimation of private returns to 
education 
The traditional way of identifying the private returns to education is estimating a Mincer type of 
wage equation: 
  i i i X E E S W e d l g b a + + + + + = 2 ln   (7.1) 
with W is wages, S is years of education, E is experience, X is a vector of covariates and ei are 
unobserved factors of individual i. Table A1 presents estimations results. Coefficients smaller 
than 0.10 can be interpreted as percent differences. Coefficients larger than 0.10 can be 
translated in percent difference with exp(C)-1, with C is coefficient. The models in table A1 
control for gender, age and age-squared. The average yearly returns can be obtained by dividing 
with the duration of education. The sample is restricted to employees of 37 to 55 year which 
only includes the old regime of university education. 
Table A.1  OLS-estimates of private returns to education in 1997 
  Total  Male  Female 
       
Lower education  - 0.195  - 0.203  - 0.196 
  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Middle general (mavo3)   - 0.006  - 0.003  - 0.001 
  (0.031)  (0.050)  (0.040) 
Lower vocational (vbo)  - 0.113  - 0.117  - 0.125 
  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Middle general (mavo4)   0.000  0.000  0.000 
Intermediate vocational (mbo)  0.101  0.084  0.112 
  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Higher general (havo)  0.092  0.078  0.102 
  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Higher professional (hbo)  0.371  0.369  0.355 
  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Pre university (vwo)  0.249  0.264  0.195 
  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.021) 
University (wo)  0.600  0.592  0.599 
  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.012) 
N  63471  40819  22652 
       
Notes: Controls used are age and age squared. Sample consists of employees of 37 to 55 year-olds in 1997. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 
In 1997 male graduates from university earned on average 80.8 percent more than graduates 
from middle general education (exp(0.592)-1). Graduates of pre university education earned on 
average 28.3 percent more than graduates from middle general education. The returns to a year 
of university education can be calculated by the difference between university and pre   34 
university graduates and dividing with the nominal duration. This gives a return to a nominal 
year of university education of: 10.8 percent for all, 10.5 percent for men and 12 percent for 
women.   35 
Appendix 2: Timing of the cut-off in the analysis 
Table A.2  Freshmen in Dutch universities by age (row percentages) 
Age  18  19  20  21 
         
College-year         
         
1980-‘81  30  26  12  32 
1981-‘82  31  26  11  32 
1982-‘83  30  26  12  32 
1983-‘84  27  26  13  34 
         
Source: CBS (1981-1985) 
 
Without delay the average age of entering university education is 18 years and 6 months. In 
table A2 age is measured at December 31 of the college-year. Students who entered without 
delay could have a maximum age of 19 years and 5 month. Table A.2 shows that a large share 
of freshmen is 19 years or older. If we assume that 19 year-olds are equally distributed over the 
year more than half of the students has a delay of one year or more. Moreover, a large share, 
approximately 30 to 50 percent, of first time enrollers drops out or switches to another study 
within higher education. The new regime started at August 1, 1982. All students born on or 
after August 1, 1963 entered the new regime. We expect that also a large share of students born 
earlier in 1963 entered the new regime due to delay in pre university education or switching to 
other studies. This implies that the majority of students born in 1963 entered the new regime. 
As we only observe year of birth in our data we assume that all university graduates born in 
1963 entered the new regime. We expect that university graduates born in 1962 are divided over 
both regimes. Therefore, we excluded these graduates from the analysis. We expect that the 
majority of university graduates born in 1961 entered the old regime.   36   37 
Appendix 3: Excluding graduates born in 1962 and 
including graduates born in 1967 
Table A.3  Wage difference between graduates born before and after 1962 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
DS+/-1  0.107       
  (0.033)       
N  613       
DS+/-2  0.086  0.154  0.136  0.134 
  (0.022)  (0.056)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
N  1204  1204  1204  1204 
DS+/-3  0.097  0.075  0.060  0.057 
  (0.019)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
N  1805  1805  1805  1805 
DS+/-4  0.109  0.075  0.063  0.062 
  (0.017)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
N  2380  2380  2380  2380 
Controls         
Experience  yes  no  no  no 
Potential experience  no  yes  yes  yes 
Firm characteristics  no  no  yes  yes 
Dummies 87/88  no  no  no  yes 
         
Notes: Graduates born in 1962 and 1963 are excluded. Graduates born in 1967 are included in the four-year sample. Controls used are 
the same as in table 5.1.  
   38 
 